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“Cut Holes and Sink ‘em”: Chemical Weapons Disposal 
and Cold War History as a History of Risk  
Simone M. Müller ∗ 
Abstract: »‘Cut Holes and Sink 'em‘: Die Entsorgung chemischer Waffen und 
die Geschichte des Kalten Kriegs als eine Geschichte des Risikos«. Using the 
incident of the scuttling of the USS Le Baron Russell Briggs, loaded with rough-
ly 22,000 tons of outdated chemical weapons in 1970, this contribution ex-
trapolates how, why, and when in the United States chemical weapons that had 
been produced as the ultimate answer to the risk of nuclear war became re-
framed as a risk themselves. The analysis settles on how questions of knowing 
and not-knowing about potentialities of future events influenced these re-
negotiation processes between the myriad actors involved such as the US mili-
tary, politicians, environmentalists, Anti-Vietnam activists, and the American 
public. Beyond analyzing historic examples of risk assessment and manage-
ment, this contribution also demonstrates how we can read the history of the 
Cold War as a history or risk. I argue that studying the controversy of operation 
CHASE 13, the sinking of the SS L. B. Briggs, from a risk perspective opens up 
new avenues into understanding the Cold War from a social and cultural per-
spective while integrating political and environmental history. 
Keywords: Chemical weapons, Cold War, environment, ocean dumping, Opera-
tion CHASE, chemical warfare. 
1.  Introduction 
It was already late afternoon when the USS Le Baron Russell Briggs finally 
sank. On August 18, 1970, US military aboard the USS Hartley watched for 
almost six hours how the aging liberty ship slowly made its way 16,000 feet 
downwards into its ocean grave. Meanwhile, a military airplane circled the site 
of the sinking. A member from the US Naval Photographic Centre filmed the 
scuttling of the old liberty ship and produced one of the few unclassified ar-
chival records from this navy mission. The silent movie shot through the win-
dows of the plane exhibits scenic images of a bright summer’s day out on the 
calm Atlantic. The audience sees how gradually and with its hulk upfront, the 
military ocean liner sinks majestically deeper and deeper until she is calmly 
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swallowed by the waves of the ocean (Department of Defense, Department of 
the Navy, Naval Photographic Center, August 18, 1970).  
Little does this peaceful imagery convey the grave potential hazards for hu-
man health and maritime environment contained in this ship’s scuttling. As this 
contribution extrapolates, “risks,” understood as how people positioned them-
selves vis-à-vis hazards, are not always clear-cut. In this case, the objects of 
risk are buried deep inside the sinking liberty ship. On its final voyage, the Le 
Baron Russell Briggs was loaded with 418 coffins, roughly 22,000 tons, of 
lethal nerve gas weaponry the US Army had classified as unfit for further usage 
or storage. Originally produced as part of an escalated retaliation strategy of the 
US military, those chemical weapons had been stored in large numbers to keep 
America “safe.” Over the years of a Cold War scenario of military threat to 
contain actual (nuclear) combat, however, they started rotting away and eating 
through their corroding containers. By the mid-1960s, many of those weapons 
had become unsafe to store and turned into hazardous waste that now awaited 
its disposal. The scuttling of the SS L. B. Briggs was the last operation within a 
series of highly controversial toxic waste ocean disposal programs of the US 
Navy between 1964 and 1970. With these missions, the US military got rid of 
unwanted hazardous material, primarily outdated chemical munitions, on old 
ships which it then scuttled at sea. Its code name CHASE stood for “Cut Holes 
and Sink ‘Em” (Ross and Amter 2010, 161).  
While the US Navy had successfully managed to keep previous CHASE 
missions secret and unobserved from US media, politicians, and the public, 
information about mission CHASE 13 leaked out in the summer of 1969. Con-
gressman Richard D. McCarthy, a Democrat from the state of New York, made 
them public and so unleashed a national and international debate on the storage 
and disposal of chemical weapons, in particular, and the practice of dumping 
toxic waste in the world’s oceans in general. Over the course of 1969 and 1970, 
the incident forced the American public, politicians, military, media, and scien-
tists to reconsider their positions towards the multiple, and even contradictory, 
natures of the United States chemical weapons stockpile. How much “risk” 
were they each willing to take to keep America “safe”?  
This contribution extrapolates how, why and when those chemical weapons 
that had been produced as the ultimate answer to the risk of nuclear war, be-
came reframed as an object of risk themselves. The analysis settles on how 
questions of knowing and not-knowing about potentialities of future events 
influenced these re-negotiation processes between the myriad actors involved. 
Yet, beyond extrapolating historic examples of risk assessment and manage-
ment, this contribution also demonstrates how we can read the history of the 
Cold War as a history or risk. Studying the controversy of operation CHASE 
13 from a risk perspective opens up new avenues into understanding the Cold 
War from a social and cultural perspective while integrating political and envi-
ronmental history. It does so in three important ways. 
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First, risks are inherently material and so was the Cold War. With this claim, 
I am drawing from environmental history with its strong focus on the natural in 
narrative and methodology. In terms of narrative, scholars increasingly point to a 
linkage of cold war and environmental history, in particular during the 1960s and 
1970s. In the context of Operation CHASE 13, the rise of environmentalism in 
the United States during the 1960s and 1970s informed and enabled protests 
against the ocean dumping and also enriched processes of re-evaluation risk 
potentialities. As Adam Rome has shown, the military operation falls into a 
period in US environmental history which had seen the shift from conserva-
tionism to environmentalism, the growth of grass-roots activism; and a general 
rising awareness for themes of pollution and environmental protection (Rome 
2001). Spurred on by Rachel Carson’s best-selling publication Silent Spring in 
1962 and framed by the Santa Barbara Oil Spill in 1969, Americans increasingly 
voiced their concerns about their environment (Carson 1964; Ross and Amter 
2010, 159; Matthew 2013). Additionally, I see Operation CHASE as one of the 
incidences that pushed for what Rome and also Keith Woodhouse have identified 
as the marriage of environmental and anti-Vietnam protest groups over a com-
mon cause in the 1960s and 1970s (Rome 2003; Woodhouse 2009). Both groups 
met in their realization that the storage of chemical weapons as well as their 
dumping into the Atlantic was risky as both of these forms of Cold War weapon 
management could have hazardous consequences. 
In terms of methodology, my story exemplifies the intricate linkage of envi-
ronmental materiality and Cold War politics, as John McNeill and Corinna 
Unger have pointed to in their edited volume Environmental Histories of the 
Cold War (McNeill and Unger 2010; similarly Closmann 2009; Tucker and 
Russell 2004). Indeed, archival records as well as the environment itself push 
scholars to re-read Cold War history also as an environmental history. Written as 
well as living material gives away how militaries employed environmental war-
fare such as the deliberate destruction of crops, trees, animals, water supplies, and 
so forth. Archival records uncover ambitions to change the direction of ocean 
currents or alter weather patterns for the benefit of military success. Governments 
built dams for practical as well as symbolic reasons, tested nuclear weapons 
which left a million-year human footprint, and employed environmentalism as a 
form of Cold War diplomacy. Clearly, as Unger and McNeill point out, “the 
Cold War was fought on Earth in the biosphere with repercussions that will last 
for perhaps a hundred thousand years” (McNeill and Unger 2010, 3). The Cold 
War and the globe’s natural environment, and with it a distinct materiality that 
from an anthropocentric perspective either posed or was “at risk,” were intri-
cately linked. Although a “cold” war, militaries around the world fought their 
battles with hazardous material that posed a risk to the world’s citizens, their 
livelihood and their environment on a daily basis.  
The Cold War, secondly, is also a story of risk management. As Arwen Mo-
hun points out, risks describe a potentiality, a future event that might or might 
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not happen (Mohun 2013). A history of risk so deals on the one hand with 
precautionary systems put in place, and with debates assessing the risk potenti-
alities in need of governance on the other hand. In the case of Operation 
CHASE 13, the materiality of those Cold War hazards evoked fierce debates on 
degrees of riskiness and risks assessments between 1969 and 1970. Actors 
debated the likelihood of an unwanted explosion of or environmental pollution 
from the chemicals in their corrosive containers. On a political level, nationally 
as well as internationally, the ocean dumping controversy gave incentive for 
governments to pass national and international environmental legislations. In 
the United States, President Richard Nixon established the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), banned ocean dumping, and re-submitted the Gene-
va Convention on chemical warfare – albeit unsuccessfully – to the US Senate 
for approval. Internationally, the UN community drafted and passed the Lon-
don Dumping Convention to protect the maritime environment from hazardous 
dumpings and ignited debates to reconsider the usage and storage of chemical-
biological weapons (CBWs) across the Iron Curtain.  
Scholars have used later incidences of chemical weapon disposal occurring 
in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States to analyze the relationship between 
democratic governments and citizen activism with regards to political govern-
ance. According to sociologist Robert Futrell, there existed a “participatory chal-
lenge” as US citizens increasingly pushed to be included in decision-making 
processes concerning environmental regulation. The US government, in turn, 
rather followed expert opinion from scientists. They took matters to be too com-
plicated for non-experts to understand (Futrell 2003). The participatory chal-
lenge, according to Futrell, and similarly Velma Campbell and Ross Vincent, was 
how to integrate demands of participation from citizen activists into political 
frameworks shaped by technocratic arrangements of governance when facing 
complex questions of science and technology (idem; Campbell and Ross 1995). 
Similar dynamics of a “participatory challenge” were at work during the 
1960s and 1970s, when politicians like Richard D. McCarthy and Edward 
Muskie alongside citizen activists rallied against the dumping of these outdated 
chemical weapons into the Atlantic. The challenge, however, lay not only in 
how to include citizens and make them understand complex technocratic pro-
cesses of governance, but how to tend to their controversial views – often con-
tradicting “expert” opinion – on the matter on the table. Consensus usually 
existed on the materiality of the hazards in question, not on their potentiality. 
Moreover, the question on the likelihood of an accident or damage was not 
easily answered scientifically.  
Finally, risk as a category helps us understand the Cold War during the 
1960s and 1970s as a highly ambivalent conflict oscillating between risk and 
safety. Scholars have long pointed to this ambiguity when discussing Richard 
Nixon’s Presidency under the premises of the madman theory. Nixon’s admin-
istration drafted US foreign policy based on the attempt to make other govern-
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mental leaders around the world believe, Nixon was mad and his behavior 
irrational and volatile. This, according to their rationale, should keep America 
safe. Likelihoods of nuclear war were portrayed to be at odds, and strategists 
like Henry Kissinger hoped that no enemy, in particular none from the Eastern 
bloc, would be willing to take the risk of unleashing a madman (Welch 2005; 
Burr and Kimball 2015; Weiner 2015). Similarly ambiguous was the employ-
ment of lethal chemical weapons for storage to keep America safe. These 
weapons were designed to kill, to hurt, and to harm human life. Any interaction 
with them was inherently dangerous. At the same time, they were the backbone 
for creating a sense of “safety” for the American nation facing the omnipresent 
“risk” of a nuclear war. During the Cold War in particular, these weapon 
stockpiles’ sole purpose of existence was to protect the Americans and the ‘free 
world’ as part of a retaliation policy (Price 1995). But these weapons could 
neither be stored indefinitely, nor was their storage easily safe. When protests 
occurred over the disposal of these weapons, two discourses of risk and safety 
focusing on the same object clashed. In the end, it was the US military that 
needed to figure out how to re-integrate the two and make risks seem control-
lable (Payne 2001; Burr and Kimball 2015).  
In my narrative on Operation CHASE 13 as a Cold War history of risk, I 
move from a section on the materiality of chemical weapons to how Congress-
man Richard D. McCarthy uncovered the military’s disposal plans, before I end 
with an analysis on the difficulties of assessing potentialities and likelihoods of 
hazardous futures. In my conclusion, finally, I will foreshadow future contro-
versies on chemical weapon disposal to illustrate the re-occurrence of certain 
trends and topics in a history of risk.  
2.  Chemical Weapons as Hazards of the Cold War 
Chemical weapons, or rather the organic phosphorus compounds they contain, 
pose one of the greatest dangers to human life in the twentieth century. If in-
haled or absorbed through the skin or eyes, even the smallest amount of these 
substances can kill in minutes. If stored improperly, those organic phosphorus 
compounds quickly contaminate their environment. Eating through their cor-
roding containers and then leaking into the soil, ground water, or ocean space, 
they kill crops and wildlife. Additionally, they pollute the air and carry their 
lethal character downwind. Throughout history, there never existed doubt about 
their hazardous character. Based on their extreme toxicity and military appro-
priate physical and chemical properties, they became important to military 
strategy during the Cold War (Environmental Protection Agency 1973, 231).  
The United States had been stockpiling unitary and binary chemical weapons 
since World War I. These consisted chiefly of three different types, namely mus-
tard gas and the two organic phosphorous nerve gas agents, GB (also known as 
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Sarin gas) and XV. Mustard gas is the ‘oldest’ chemical warfare agent. It is a 
blister agent that creates chemical burns. If inhaled, mustard gas can cause a 
fatal outpouring of liquid into the lungs, so-called pulmonary edema. European 
scientists discovered the nerve gas agents GB (Sarin) and VX in the 1930s and 
1950s. These warfare agents destroy the nervous system. GB is quite volatile 
and kills within minutes of inhalation; VX is a colorless and odorless liquid and 
less volatile. It is lethal when inhaled as a vapor or when absorbed through the 
eyes or skin contact (Tanzman 1994; Marrs, Maynard and Sidell 2007; State-
ment of Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Ninety-First Congress 1970, 59-60).  
Militaries produced organic phosphorus chemical warfare agents as liquids, 
as sprays, and as aerosols. With these chemical weapons, long-lasting contami-
nation of the atmosphere would have been possible due to their volatility, their 
good aerosol properties, and their high toxicity. Both BG and VX can be used 
as aerosols under all meteorological conditions. Their period of effectiveness 
even increases with decreasing temperature. Under favorable meteorological 
conditions, the detonation or vaporization cloud of these chemical warfare 
agents may spread up to 30 kilometers from the point of origin. Beyond that 
range, concentrations may still be present in a concentration that leads to com-
bat incapacity (EPA 1973, 232). In the 1960s, scientists assessed the V agents 
to be “several hundred times more toxic than the most lethal chemical weapons 
before the advent of the nerve gases” (Cookson and Nottingham 1969, 221). By 
their chemical set-up, these weapons were efficient, toxic, and lethal instru-
ments of mass destruction.  
Ironically, the use of chemical weapons during World War I led to their 
over-production and stockpiling on a grand scale after World War II. All major 
powers, including the United States, had used chemical weapons in the First 
World War. During that conflict, over one million men were wounded by gas, 
with 90,000 or more fatalities. Vivid news accounts on the impacts of mustard 
gas usage on soldiers, civilians, and the environment triggered fervent interna-
tional public outcry over such “uncivilized” warfare immediately after the war 
(Campbell and Ross 1995, 115). Even decades later, in the age of nuclear 
weapons, to most Americans “poison gas [still] seemed more terrible and bar-
baric than tanks, machine guns, long range artillery, aerial bombing and subma-
rine” (Muskie 1969). As early as 1925, the international community established 
the Geneva Protocol that forbad the first use of these weapons in combat (Krass 
1997; United Nations 1925). When, during World War II, combatants managed 
to avoid the usage of poison gas, the American public was “lulled into thinking 
that poison gas would not be used again,” according to Democratic Senator 
Edward Muskie when rallying for a ban of chemical weapons (Muskie 1969). 
Yet, the Geneva protocol did not eradicate chemical weapons. Rather, the pro-
tocol’s barring of first use led to an almost paradox system. Nations on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain started stockpiling chemical weapons, simply because 
“the other side might have it” (Bennett, Ninety-First Congress 1970, 64). In 
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case the other party would strike first, military strategists argued, they wanted 
to be ready to retaliate-in-kind (or more). If attacked by chemical weapons, 
they wanted to be at least able to impose upon an enemy (that was obviously 
prepared for it with gas-masks because he struck first) “the handicap of operat-
ing in a toxic environment” (Bennett in Ninety-First Congress 1970, 64).  
Over the course of the Cold War, this logic of deterrence prevailed. Chemi-
cal weapons, alongside nuclear weapons, were produced and stored in order to 
prevent their usage. Military strategists argued for the importance of the art of 
coercion, of intimidation, and deterrence. According to historian Thomas 
Schelling, at the time, a nation’s military strength was evaluated in its capacity 
to harm another state. Bargaining power was derived from the ability to hurt 
without making use of it. The art was to influence another state’s behavior by 
its anticipation of the employment of force only. Deterrence was most success-
ful when the power to hurt was held in reserve (Schelling 1966). Consequently, 
chemical weapons, alongside nuclear weapons, became the pillars of Cold War 
military strategies of deterrence and a policy of escalated retaliation.  
Entrenched in this logic of deterrence and escalated retaliation, the US Ar-
my was, by the 1950s, producing thousands of gallons of organophosphorus 
agents. Its stockpiles contained mortar and howitzer shells, bombs, and 
landmines, all filled with mustard gas, Sarin (GB), or XV gas. It also used the 
deadly liquids to fill the warheads of perhaps as many as 100,000 M-55 rockets 
(EPA 1973, 232; New York Times 1981). Between 1961 and 1969 alone, the US 
military spent $2 billion dollars on its chemical weapon stockpile (Ninety-First 
US Congress 1970, 3). In the 1960s, President Kennedy gave orders to store these 
chemical weapons on American military bases all around the world. In the Pacific 
region, they could be found on Okinawa, a Japanese island then under American 
jurisdiction as well as Johnston Atoll, an American military base close to Hawaii. 
In Europe, American military stored those weapons primarily in Western Germa-
ny. Additionally, eight sites on US continental soil in Utah, Arkansas, Oregon, 
Colorado, Alabama, Maryland, Indiana, and Kentucky were home to these 
chemical weapons. Over the years, Anniston, Alabama, became the largest site 
of chemical weapons in the Western world (New York Times, August 9, 1970).  
Starting after World War I, militaries throughout the world had to learn how 
to manage these stockpiles of chemical weapons that started piling up on the 
home front. Because of their chemical nature, these weapons could not be 
stored indefinitely. Rather, they were ticking time bombs. While Cold War 
armies were building up immense stockpiles of chemical weapons, military 
officials also had to meet the challenges of unserviceable weapons due to im-
proper storage, technologically outdated weapons due to changing technologi-
cal standards (for instance when chemical weapon design moved from unitary 
to binary weapons in the 1970s), or massive stockpile increases after victorious 
nations took over their enemies’ stockpiles. The greatest danger of these weap-
on stockpiles resulted from leakages through corrosive aluminum walls or from 
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unwanted explosion on site. In contrast to modern binary chemical weapons, 
which require two components to be mixed before they become lethal, up until 
the 1970s, chemical weapons were manufactured containing unitary chemicals 
– fully potent and deadly in their aging containers (ibid.; Smothers 1994). By 
the mid-1960s, tons of chemical weapons had transitioned from serviceable to 
unserviceable and so from weapon to waste.  
Up until the early 1970s, the world’s militaries’ standard procedure for re-
moving outdated or unwanted chemical weapons from their stockpiles was to 
dump them in the oceans. Over the course of only few decades, they so filled 
the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Atlantic, in particular, with tons of poi-
son gas containers, sometimes at shallow depths and close to shore. After 
World War II, for instance, the Allied powers seized nearly 300,000 tons of 
chemical weapons from the National Socialists alone and simply dumped them 
in the oceans. Under the heading Operation Davey Jones Locker, the US mili-
tary sank 30,000 to 40,000 tons of these poison gas containers into Scandinavi-
an waters between 1946 and 1948. Another 46,000 tons were dumped into the 
Baltic Sea. Similarly, also the Soviets discarded some of their munition in 
wooded cases in Baltic waters. In the late 1940s, the British sank 34 shiploads 
with 127,000 tons of chemical and conventional weapons in the Norwegian 
Trench and dumped other hazardous loads at a site 20 miles west of Ireland. In 
the mid-1950s, the British scuttled three large merchant ships with nerve and 
mustard gas agents off the Outer Hebrides and Northern Ireland in an operation 
known as “Operation Sandcastle.” One of the biggest post-World War II ocean 
dumpings in American waters occurred off the coast of South Carolina. Be-
tween 1946 and 1948, the US military sank about 15,000 tons of German-made 
nerve gas bombs and US made lewisite bombs unceremoniously into the ocean. 
Many more ocean dumpings followed in the early Cold War years (Christian-
son 2010, 133; US Army Research 2001).  
An iron curtain of secrecy covered all these missions. None of the military 
officials ever informed local fishermen or checked to determine what damage 
had been caused. Furthermore, for years, the militaries did not keep records of 
what and how much they dumped where. To this day, marine biologists have 
not determined where all these dumpings took place or what its effects were or 
still might be (Christianson 2010, 134). Still, for decades, ocean dumping re-
mained the preferred method of disposal. Little did politicians, the media, or 
the public seem to care about the potential hazards for human life and envi-
ronment involved in this disposal method – as long as it kept America safe.  
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3.  Changing Tides: Chemical Weapon Disposal as a Risk 
for the American Home Front 
Up to the late 1960s, the hazards involved in the storage and disposal of out-
dated chemical weapons was apparent to US military personnel. It seemed 
manageable, though. Other actors, politicians, the media, and the US public, 
did not seem to pay much attention at all to the risks involved in the established 
system of chemical weapons management. Throughout the 1960s, as Senator 
Muskie wrote in a letter published in the Boston Globe, Members of Congress 
were only “vaguely aware” of the chemical warfare research and development 
programs, “but regarded them as contingency operations (1) to deter other na-
tions from using such weapons first, and (2) to aid in research on counter-
measures” (Muskie 1969). Similarly, civilians living near those army bases serv-
ing as storage base for the chemical weapons stockpile remained relatively una-
ware of their proximity to danger. In an interview from 1994, Curtis Penny, one 
of 300 civilian employees responsible for the chemical stockpile at Anniston 
Alabama, recalled an utter obliviousness among the US public. This was even 
true for army employees monitoring the outdated chemical weapons, such as 
Curtis Penny. Neither Penny nor any other of his colleagues would talk much 
about their work monitoring thousands of containers of deadly chemicals. Their 
daily tools of trade required them to wear protective clothing, carry a gas mask, 
and a syringe full of atropine. In case one of those containers leaked their dead-
ly contents, they would have had to inject the heart stimulant immediately if 
they wanted to survive. Still, there was utter silence (Smothers 1994).  
Despite this silence, according to Curtis Penny, “everybody must have 
known of the chemicals stored” at the place. People “just didn’t like to think 
about them” (Smothers 1994). Even more so, as gas and germ warfare or any 
sort of usage of these weapons “seemed a subject for science fiction,” according 
to Senator Edmund Muskie (Muskie 1969). The likelihood of a hazardous future 
seemed very far away to most Americans. Another reason for such risk negation 
among the citizens surrounding the Army’s outdated chemical weapon depots 
was economic, according to Penny. Since the Army had first come to Anniston, 
Alabama in the 1950s, the depot and Fort McClelland, a center for research of 
chemical and biological weapons, had come to form the economic bedrock of 
the region. People there grew to “trust and depend on the Army” (Smothers 
1994). For them, the military well handled the risks involved in the storage and 
disposal of chemical weapons.  
This assessment of the weapon stockpiles’ riskiness changed dramatically at 
the end of the 1960s. Then, the chemical weapon stockpile turned from a risk 
for the Cold War enemy only to an environmental and health risk for the whole 
American nation. The Cold War, with its hazards, had arrived at the home 
front. At the time, events pointing to the uncontrollability of these chemicals 
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overlapped with the emergence of environmentalism as a mass movement in 
the United States. The increase of outdated weapons, moreover, forced the 
military, too, to reconsider its disposal mechanisms. In mid-1969, the situation 
culminated in a big public and political outcry over the management and dis-
posal of those chemical weapons rotting away.  
First, environmentalism’s move into the center of the American society pro-
vided the backbone for the ocean dumping scandal over CHASE 13 to erupt. 
Throughout the 1960s, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson had 
made the environment part of their political agenda. Kennedy, for instance, 
supported new federal programs to assist the acquisition of open space through 
local and state governments and endorsed measures to preserve wilderness. In 
1962, he hosted a White House conference on conservation. Johnson chose to 
put even more emphasis on the environment than Kennedy. In his May 1964 
speech on the Great Society, his first on this political framework, he weaved 
environmental aspects with the abolition of poverty and racial injustice (Rome 
2003, 533). After all, America was not only the strong and the free, but also 
“America the beautiful” (Johnson 1965, 704-5). This beauty was at danger. 
America’s Great Society, according to Lyndon B. Johnson, would also be a place 
“where man [could] renew contact with nature.” At the same time, citizen action 
groups, such as women activists, increasingly engaged with the environment. 
Numbers of environmental articles rose exponentially between 1950 and 1960 
and membership numbers of the Sierra Club, the oldest environmental action 
group in the United States, and others like it doubled and tripled. Finally, by the 
late 1960s the environmental cause also attracted millions of people in their 
teens and twenties. This helped make environmentalism a mass movement 
embraced by young and old. In such a setting, debates over the use of tear gas, 
defoliants, and napalm in Vietnam framed what was about to come and linked 
Cold War policies with an environmental agenda (Rome 2003, 527, 541).  
Second, at the end of the 1960s, vigorous public complaints against the use 
and storage of chemical and biological weapons erupted with news of dangers 
from testing and disposal. The most prominent incident was the death of over 
6,000 sheep in Utah, near the Dugway Proving Testing Ground. In spring 1968, 
an army plane flying over the testing ground had released the nerve gas XV for 
testing purposes. Wind, however, carried the gas down range to where large 
herds of sheep grazed. For weeks throughout 1968, military secrecy cloaked 
the cause of the deaths of these sheep. Official and unofficial investigations 
followed and by 1969, the military agreed to pay for the sheep. It never admit-
ted any sort of guilt. Documentation of the Dugway case, according to Chicago 
Tribune journalist Gordon Harrison, left the American nation “blinking at its 
double image: a great democracy boasting of itself as defender of humane and 
civilized values and all the while developing, testing and stockpiling gas weap-
ons that the conscience of the world had long ago at Geneva agreed to outlaw” 
(Harrison 1969). Incidents such as the dead sheep in Utah, so it seems, height-
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ened politicians’ as well as the public’s awareness for the hazards involved in 
the US chemical weapon stockpile.  
Finally, in connection with its increasing engagement in Vietnam, also the 
US military paid greater attention to its chemical weapon stockpile throughout 
the 1960s. In late 1963, just prior to the US military build-up in South East 
Asia, authorities of the US Army sent inquiries to the Bureau of Naval Weap-
ons concerning the condition of the expendable ordnance. The Bureau under-
took a surveillance program to determine to what degree the chemical weapon 
storage had deteriorated and discovered several leakages. This increased the 
request for shipments of deteriorated explosives to the deep water preparation 
site. In addition, the closing of the Naval Ammunition Depot at Hastings, Ne-
braska, had generated large amounts of outdated chemical weapons that await-
ed disposal (Kurak 1970, 23378). During a later government inquiry, NSA 
scientists similarly found, alone at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver, Colo-
rado, one of the production sites of the CW rockets, 21,000 leaky nerve gas 
bomb clusters. Citing such unforeseeable incidents as a sniper’s bullet, the 
scientists stated that they could not “exclude the remote possibility of a cata-
strophic explosion” which could cause “casualties far beyond the capacity of 
the attendant medical staff to handle” (Science News 1969, 26). For insiders of 
the military, it was obvious already by the mid-1960s that the US Army had, in 
the words of the magazine Science, “a tiger by the tail” (Selin and VanDeveer 
2013, 499). This increasing number of outdated weapons had to go somewhere 
– and fast.  
As mentioned earlier, up to this point the military’s standard procedure for 
removing outdated or unwanted chemical weapons from their stockpiles was to 
dump them in the oceans. Covering 70 percent of the earth’s surface, maritime 
space easily allowed for an out-of-sight, out-of-mind policy, particularly well-
suited to cover-up militarization’s most toxic remnants (Park and O’Connor 
1981, 4). Military officials throughout the world simply presumed that the “vast, 
cold ocean was the safest place to discard it.” Military scientists thought that “the 
action of the seawater would eventually render the chemicals inert” (Christianson 
2010, 134). It seems as if they were oblivious to the damage or potential risks the 
ocean dumping could cause to humans and marine life for generations to come. 
In the summer of 1969, Acting-Assistant Secretary of the Army, Charles L. Poor, 
confessed before Congress that the military had always looked on the ocean floor 
“as a kind of ‘Davey Jones Locker’ remote and inaccessible where ‘things could 
be put and forgotten’” (Selin and VanDeveer 2013, 499). Not being infected by 
ideas of conservation and nature preservation as they were discussed by Ameri-
can environmentalists on a large scale at the time, the US military was not to give 
up maritime space as perfect disposal site. Facing large numbers of toxic waste, 
however, it changed its disposal procedure to make disposal faster.  
Up until the mid-1960s, the standard procedure of chemical weapon ocean 
dumping was to load chemical weapons into containers and add sand or cement 
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for additional ballast. The containers were then loaded onto a ship, transported 
to the dump site, and manhandled over the site. Costs for this rather cumber-
some disposal method were estimated at about $78,000 per ton. The rapid 
build-up of outdated chemical weapons awaiting disposal in the mid-1960s 
soon indicated that the US Army, and similarly other militaries around the 
world, had to find a faster and cheaper large-volume method of disposal. The 
first inspiration for Operation CHASE, the scuttling of entire ships loaded with 
outdated chemical weapons, came from a similar incident in 1958, when the 
US Army had had to get rid of 8,000 tons of mustard gas and lewisite chemical 
warfare gas. It then loaded the gas onto the SS Wm. Ralston, towed her to sea, 
and scuttled her there. In the mid-1960s, the US revived this ocean dumping 
practice of sinking entire ships with operation CHASE, an acronym for “cut 
holes and sink ‘em.” Although missions were not running smoothly – the second 
CHASE ship, the SS Village, for instance, exploded five minutes after she sank 
in 1964 – news did not leak or concern about these missions was not voiced until 
CHASE 13 – the sinking of the SS L. B. Briggs in the summer of 1969 (Kurak 
1970, 23378). Then, the secretive dumping of more than 21,000 M-55 rockets 
and other chemical weapon material in the Atlantic caused a national and inter-
national scandal. It nearly brought the United States before the international 
High Court of the Seas and fueled the country’s national crisis of anti-Vietnam 
protests. It ended with a re-assessment of Cold War risk represented in these 
weapon stockpiles originally meant to keep America safe.  
4.  Uncovering a Hornet’s Nest: Richard D. McCarthy and 
Operation CHASE 13  
The course of events started in early May 1969, when Congressman Richard D. 
McCarthy, a Democrat from the state of New York, uncovered information 
about CHASE 13 and decided to drop the political bomb. At the time, McCar-
thy had been investigating the US military’s chemical weapon policy for some 
time. In January 1969, he had published his book The Ultimate Folly, a politi-
cal treatise of opposition as well as a report on chemical and biological warfare 
by the United States (McCarthy 1969). According to Chicago Tribune journal-
ist Harrison, it had been a news report on the Dugway incident that triggered 
McCarthy’s curiosity. Feeling disturbed about the dead sheep in Utah and 
simultaneously unknowledgeable of the military doings, he decided to dig into 
it (Harrison 1969). In May 1969, McCarthy learned about US military plans to 
move 22,000 tons of poison gas munitions from various army arsenals and 
depots to the Naval Ammunition Depot at Earle, New Jersey. There, the mate-
rial was to be loaded on old Liberty ships, taken to sea, and sunk. As McCarthy 
stated before Congress in August 1969, he was concerned that during this toxic 
waste disposal mission “large quantities of nerve gas and mustard gas […] 
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might accidentally [be] released” with “deadly effects on people living near the 
railroads,” or similarly for the “sailors on vessels near the scene” of disposal. In 
addition, he also voiced his concern for the “ecology of the ocean” when haz-
ardous material was dumped in “a manner that had not been contemplated” 
(McCarthy in Congression Records August 12, 1969, 23377).  
Following McCarthy’s going public with military plans, several parties op-
posing ocean dumping jumped into action. On May 13, the New York Times 
reported of a resolution unanimous adopted on May 11 by the Monmouth, 
Ocean, Atlantic, and Cape May Counties, which raised the “urgent question of 
safety to the people of New Jersey” if army plans were followed through. 
County mayors urged their congressional representatives “to interpose strenu-
ous objections with the United States Army” (Resolution cited in New York 
Times, May 13, 1969). Simultaneously, Representative Cornelius Gallagher of 
New Jersey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements, held hearings on May 8, 13, 14, and 15, 1969 in order to 
learn more about these shipments scheduled to begin May 16 (House of Repre-
sentatives 1969, 23377).  
This sudden attention and opposition rather surprised the US military. The 
first hearing of May 8 had to be re-scheduled. The Department of Defense was 
“not prepared to discuss the disposal plans” yet (House of Representatives 
1969, 23377). Science News reporters later suggested that this was because, 
prior to the exposure of Operation CHASE 13 through Congressman McCar-
thy, the army had not even “solicit[ed] scientific opinion” (Science News 95 
1969, 609). Only five days later, on May 13, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Research and Development of the US Army, Charles L. Poor, and Dr. Robert 
A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary for Research and Development of the US Navy 
appeared as principal witnesses before Congress. Most of their testimony was 
based on a scientific review held “just four days prior to the Army’s appearance 
before the subcommittee, and after the Army had been summoned to justify its 
plan” (ibid.). Thus equipped with scientific back-up, they attempted to answer all 
questions raised by members of Congress concerning the safety of the disposal 
plans as well as the effects of prior CHASE missions. 12 times so far, unwanted 
ammunition had been taken to sea, entirely unobserved from the American pub-
lic, representatives of Congress, or administrative staff from the US State De-
partment or the Department of the Interior. Only hours before the trains of chemi-
cal weapons were scheduled to make way towards New Jersey’s shore, CHASE 
13, the sinking of the Le Baron Russell Briggs was halted (House of Representa-
tives 1969, 23377; Science News 95, 1969, 609; Egginton 1969).  
Between May 1969 and August 1970, numerous hearings before various 
subcommittees of the US Congress followed, multiple scientific commissions 
were formed to evaluate the best practice of weapon disposal, and from late 
June 1969 onwards, the American media started reporting extensively on the 
subject. Concerned politicians from both sides of the political aisle were eager 
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to find out more about the disposal of outdated chemical weapons and possible 
alternatives to ocean dumping. The Department of Defense, in turn, appeared 
reluctant to abandon its original plans of scuttling the Le Baron Russell Briggs. 
Army officials soon grew impatient with the delay imposed upon them and 
attempted to rush decisions. They claimed that ocean dumping would no longer 
be feasible later in 1969 due to the beginning of the winter storm season on the 
North Atlantic. Additionally, it would take three months for some 20 trains to 
be loaded and moved to Earle, New Jersey, where the ships would be loaded. If 
the scientific reports were not completed by the end of June 1969, ocean dump-
ing would be ruled out for yet another year (Science News 95, 1969, 609).  
The Department of Defense’s strategy to rush matters along was to sell ocean 
dumping as the safest best practice for the disposal of these outdated chemical 
weapons. When in May 1969, Secretaries Poor and Frosch were summoned 
before Congress, they assured the congressional committee that disposal at sea 
of unwanted nerve gas and mustard gas was the safest procedure. The ships 
would be sunk in water about 7,200 feet deep where currents were very slow 
and the gas would have an opportunity to dissolve over a long period of time. 
Richard McCarthy quoted Frosch to have said at the time that it would be “at 
best something over 40 years” before containers could re-surface. Much more 
likely, the gas would dissolve out “so that it would be in below-detectable trace 
amounts” (Frosch in House of Representatives 1969, 23377). Both army ex-
perts attempted to be re-assuring, moving the risks associated with ocean 
dumping into some unlikely far-away future.  
Selling ocean dumping as safe did not work well for the US military. The 
Department of Defense followed a poor communication strategy and steadily 
lost credibility. Poor and Frosch, for instance, reported to Congress about an 
ocean dumping case when the ship loaded with explosives failed to explode at 
the planned depth. They did not, however, inform Congress about the case of 
the SS Village, the second CHASE mission. This ship was loaded with more 
than 7,000 tons of outdated chemical weapons when scuttled. Five minutes 
after she was sunk on September 17, 1964, three explosions were felt. An oil 
slick and debris appeared on the water surface and it was clear that some part 
of the cargo had detonated. The explosions were large enough to appear on 
seismic equipment all over the world and soon the US received inquiries about 
earthquakes along the East coast. At the time, none of this was made public, 
and, when interrogated before Congress in May 1969, Frosch and Poor still 
tried to cover it up. McCarthy only happened to come across this information 
weeks later when he read an article by Steve Kurak, a civilian employee of the 
Army, in the US Naval Institute Proceedings that briefly mentioned the inci-
dent. This breach of trust in addition to the report of a subsequent adhoc com-
mittee of the National Academy of Science from June 1969, only confirmed the 
opposition’s doubts and skepticism regarding ocean dumping (Frosch in House 
of Representatives 1969, 23377; Kurak 1967).  
HSR 41 (2016) 1  │  277 
The probability of hazards, or degree of riskiness, of these stockpiles rotting 
away remained obscure over the months to come. Over the course of 1969 and 
1970, no party involved doubted the potential immediate deadliness of these 
weapons for everyone and everything living within a range of three square 
kilometers. Dangers seemed particularly prevalent during the transportation of 
these weapons from their stockpiles all over the United States – and as it later 
on turned out also Germany and Japan – to their disposal site. Little consensus 
existed on just how likely accidents were on route to disposal or what immedi-
ate and long-term effects exactly the disposal would have. Furthermore, ex-
perts, military officials, politicians, and public laymen disagreed fundamentally 
on what the safest method of disposal could be: ocean dumping, incineration, 
or an underground nuclear explosion? 
5.  Potentialities and Likelihoods: Re-Assessing the Risks 
of Chemical Weapon Disposal 
Knowledge seemed to be key in a situation where no exact data was easily 
procured. On the one hand, the Department of Defense was rather stuck up in 
providing information on chemical biological warfare to the public. On the 
other hand, the Pentagon had little to no oceanographic data on the effects of 
ocean dumping to provide the public with.  
Even for Congressman McCarthy, it proved to be exceedingly difficult to 
breach the overextended walls of Pentagon secrecy. In a meeting before Con-
gress on the American ratification of the Geneva Protocol in early November 
1969, McCarthy complained about military information procedures. He empha-
sized the difficulty of retrieving the right or relevant information on chemical 
weapons from the Department of Defense or the Department of the Interior. Both, 
he claimed, did not “too readily come forward with this information.” And so, in 
order to be able to “pick it out, one at a time,” those interested in the processes 
and effects of managing chemical weapons in the United States had to “became 
almost a scholar, and be so informed that [they knew] the right questions to ask,” 
according to McCarthy (McCarthy in Ninety-First Congress 1969, 41). Passing 
out such information, however, was a delicate issue, possibly encroaching upon 
necessary Cold War secrecy. After all, as Congressman Wayne Hays, Democrat 
from Ohio, pointed out, might be “vital to national security.” If the military did 
not want “the Russians to know” about it, according to Hays, “they had not 
better tell it to a committee of the Congress, […] because it [would] be in the 
paper the next day” (Hays in Ninety-First Congress 1969, 42). This did not 
impress opponents of ocean dumping. “The public has got to know more,” 
urged Kevin Shea, scientific director of the Committee for Environmental 
Information (Shea in Egginton 1969).  
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Throughout the ocean dumping crisis, the US military was certainly not the 
most forthcoming, transparent, or supportive partner for those interested in 
genuinely assessing the risks of ocean dumping. Opponents of ocean dumping, 
in turn, doubted that this information policy was necessarily a question of na-
tional security. For them, it seemed to show that the Pentagon was not genuine-
ly interested in sharing information or finding an alternative to ocean dumping.  
At the same time, some credibility needs to be restored to the Department of 
Defense. The confusion about the hazardous potentiality of CHASE 13 was not 
solely a question of military secrecy, but also of lacking information. Neither 
independent nor army scientists did have exact data at the time on effects of 
ocean dumping on marine life. This became blatantly obvious over the series of 
government hearings between May 1969 and August 1970. On May 9, 1969, 
the US Army summoned Bostwick Kechum as exterior expert to answer ques-
tions on pressure effects, speed of descent, diffusion and chemical decay rates, 
and the effect of bottom currents. After the interrogation, the oceanographer 
from the National Science Foundation expressed utter “amazement that so little 
was known” (Science News 95, 1969, 609). Gaps in knowledge existed, accord-
ing to Bostwick in an interview with Science News in June 1969, “even in the 
most obvious areas.” The Navy had little data on the terminal velocity of those 
ships when they hit the bottom or the impact effect on the gas containers and 
explosive charges. Part of the problem was that, prior to May 9, 1969, the Pen-
tagon had not considered it necessary to collect data on the maritime environ-
ment. Four days before Poor and Frosch were summoned before Congress in 
May 1969, “the Army did not have [any] data” (Bostwick in Science News 95, 
1969, 609).  
The situation of lacking data had not changed much one year later. On Au-
gust 5, 1970, the US Senate held another hearing on the environmental effects 
of ocean dumping and biological damage to marine life. Facing a crossfire 
interrogation from Senator Ernest Hollings, a Democrat from South Carolina, 
Army spokesman Dr. Cheek crumbled almost immediately. He had to admit 
not only that the Army had not made “any biological tests off the New Jersey 
costs,” but also had not “participated in any pre-dumping survey of that area” 
prior to the CHASE missions. Cheek’s attempted to save face with the claim 
that oceanographic photographs concerning older CHASE missions that had 
been made “in the general area” showed “no evidence […] that there was any 
measurable or detectable change in the ecology” was unsuccessful. First, he 
had to admit that these photographs had not been taken at the “exact site.” Then 
he had to reveal that the hulks of some CHASE ships sunk, such as the SS 
Robert L. Stevenson, “had not been located” (United States Senate 1970, 19; 
Coast Guard Records 1967). And so it was “difficult to tell how close to the 
hulk these photographs were taken.” Lacking proper maps and estimates of the 
ocean currents, the Navy could not find many of its CHASE ships again after it 
had scuttled them at sea. Senator Hollings closed his interrogation with a sneer 
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at the role of exact science as such: “As a scientist,” he said to Cheek, “you are 
giving exact testimony but the fact is that you haven’t found the sunken hulks 
off the New Jersey coast” (United States Senate 1970, 19). The credibility of 
Department of Defense, as well as that of its scientific witnesses, was done 
with after this meeting.  
In the months to come, scientists called on from supporters as well as oppo-
nents of ocean dumping did little to re-establish a sense of safety among the 
American public. It seemed that they had lost their scientific authority. In July 
1969, scientists from the National Academy of Science officially declared to 
Science News that they “considered themselves inadequately qualified to give 
an exhaustive study of the problem of disposing of 418 concrete coffins con-
taining M55 nerve gas rockets” (Science News 96, 1969, 26). This debate on 
data and the exactness of oceanographic science between 1969 and 1970 visu-
alized the capricious character and obscurity of this particular risk of ocean 
dumping chemical weapons. Contemporaries felt that there was no scientific 
truth to be had to help assess potentialities. A sense of insecurity only grew 
between late 1969 and summer 1970. 
Because of lacking data, a best practice method for disposing this toxic 
waste was not easily found. After, in May 1969, Operation CHASE 13 had 
been suspended, various scientists attempted to find the perfect solution to the 
disposal of these outdated chemical weapons. On June 25, 1969, a panel of 
scientists from the National Academy of Science recommended that the Army 
rather dispose of its tons of chemical warfare agents on government installa-
tions by means of chemicals or incineration. The shipment cross country and 
subsequent ocean dumping was not favored (Associated Press 1969). At the 
same time, the National Academy of Science recommended that the Army 
“convene a group of technically experts to determine if there was any practical 
feasible alternative to sea disposal.” For a while, scientists discussed the option 
of disposing the waste material by means of a nuclear underground explosion, 
but this was opposed by the Atomic Energy Commission. In the summer of 
1970, the Department of Defense returned to its original plan of ocean dumping 
for lack of better alternatives as well as for lack of more time to investigate 
safer alternatives. Over a year after CHASE 13 had been exposed and “after 
numerous studies by experts and tests for alternatives,” the Army concluded 
that there was “practically no feasible alternative to dumping the vaults [of 
chemical weapons] at sea” (Beal in United States Senate 1969, 3). At the same 
time, military spokesman Thaddeus R. Beal told the US Congress that there 
was no time to waste because the corroding containers of nerve gas were “be-
coming more dangerous every day.” On August 4, Army Undersecretary Beal 
told Congress that they must be dumped into the ocean without delay. “Time is 
of the essence,” he said (Beal in Chicago Tribune 1970).  
In August 1970, the Army brought operation CHASE 13 to conclusion, 
sticking with its original plan. Two diesel locks were scheduled to pull 12 
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gondola cars containing the nerve gas rockets set in concrete coffins from the 
American inland towards North Carolina’s coast. Additionally, the train con-
tained 11 cars carrying support troops, guards, medical personnel, fire trucks, 
and emergency equipment. A pilot train passed half an hour earlier. The con-
tainers were then to be loaded on board the Le Baron Russell Briggs, brought 
out to sea and scuttled.  
Making a decision did not re-establish a sense of safety among the Ameri-
can public. Not everyone agreed with the Pentagon’s assessment that ocean 
dumping was “safe” or at least “the safest” option. Several politicians attempt-
ed to stop the shipment of the outdated chemical weapons fearing the risks of 
the transport. The Republican mayor of Macon, Georgia, Ronnie Thompson, 
threatened a federal court injunction to prevent the train from passing through 
his city. If the train were not re-routed, Thompson clamored, he would have his 
200-man police force stop it at the city limits and arrest “as many people as 
possible” (Thompson in Lyons 1970). Similarly, Florida’s Governor Claud 
Kirk also talked about seeking a court injunction to stop the operation for fear 
of the potential damage to Florida’s tourist coast (Lyons 1970). Also in North 
Carolina protesters greeted the trains. In the tiny town of Waxham, anti-war 
protesters, including an army doctor on leave, held up signs reading “Nerve 
Gas makes me nervous,” or “With Defence like this, who needs enemies?” 
Camera men from Charlotte, North Carolina’s largest city, came especially into 
this town of 1200. WMAP, the local radio station, broadcasted a junction-by-
junction description as the trains passed through (Auerbach 1970). The US 
public vigilantly followed every move of the Cold War at the home front.  
Some civilians and politicians still believed the Pentagon’s risk assessment. 
Georgia’s governor, for instance, published statements of trust in the safety of 
the transport. He volunteered to ride “atop the concrete coffins containing the 
rockets as the train rides through Georgia” (Lyons 1970). Similarly, protest 
culture in Waxham, North Carolina, illustrated the lack of a consensus on safe-
ty and risk. Most anti-war protesters came from Charlotte, 40 miles away, to 
greet the trains in the first town they passed through in North Carolina. Mean-
while, towns people had put up signs that said “Good Luck” or “It’s nervy, but 
come on through.” The town’s police chief stated that citizens were not worried 
about the gas; they just “didn’t want nobody hurt” (Auerbach 1970). Some 
people seemed to take the train transport like a happening. The town’s rever-
end, James King, noticed that this was the most people he had ever seen at the 
train station. As the train passed, soldiers waved at girls standing on an over-
pass. Others flashed a “V” sign for victory at the people. In the evening, one 
observer was reported stating: “It was a nice outfit that went through! All those 
soldiers, it was like a parade” (Auerbach 1970). In the small town of Waxham, 
Americans of all ages, colors, and political and social backgrounds demonstrat-
ed insecurity prevalent in the whole country at the time: how risky were those 
outdated chemical weapons and their disposal after all for their health and the 
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marine environment? And were they willing to take this unpredictable risk to 
keep America “safe” from potential Cold War attacks?  
6.  Conclusion 
In this confusion about the potentialities of risks stemming from chemical 
weapon disposal, the Department of Defense finally determined ocean dumping 
to be the safest method of all. Still, CHASE 13 became the last ocean dumping 
mission of toxic waste in US history. Although the question of risk potentiali-
ties involved in ocean dumping could not be solved over the course of 1969 
and 1970 by means of science, the Department of Defense gave way to other 
pressures. It realized that “public concern about the dumping [was] very real” – 
scientifically sustainable or not. Pressures stemming from worried action 
groups and politicians were too strong to continue with old practices. In August 
1970, the Pentagon promised that after this final ocean dumping mission, 
CHASE 13, there would be “no more dumping of defective poison gas weap-
ons in the ocean and no more carrying them around the country, scaring the 
populace.” In February 1971, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird officially 
announced that “in a move to protect the environment,” the Army banned the 
“dumping of obsolete gas and explosive weapons into the ocean.” Only some 
months later, the international community passed the London Dumping Con-
vention of 1972, prohibiting the very same action on a global level.  
While this might be a fairy-tale ending for environmentalism in its concern 
for maritime space, future events soon showed that structures and dynamics in 
managing the risks of chemical weapons would not change. The US military’s 
environmental concern did not last. It also did not abandon the production or 
stockpiling of chemical weapons. It only attempted to make them “safer.” In 
1973, the Pentagon announced that it would spend $200 million dollars on the 
production of a new type of nerve gas, known as binary gas. New chemical 
weapons would contain two nerve gas agents, which were closely resembling 
insecticides and relatively harmless when separate. Only when combined they 
produced the lethal nerve gas. Such binary weapons would be much “far safer” 
to handle, transport, and store. The Army hoped that this would alleviate the 
public’s concern that had followed Operation CHASE. At the time, the De-
partment of Defense concealed that it would have to spend the same amount of 
money on the disposal of its old stockpile.  
Risks and risk management are not clear-cut, in particular when it concerns 
hazardous objects. To this day, the United States, just as other military nations 
all around the world, has an ambivalent relationship to chemical warfare and 
the management and disposal of chemical weapons. They oscillate between 
their ambition to manage the risk and to keep themselves and their environment 
safe from harm. While this ambivalence is integral to any military conflict, it 
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was particularly apparent during the Cold War, which was in particular during 
the 1960s and 1970s – as this chapter showed – a continuous struggle of risk 
assessment and risk management.  
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